• Oil & Gas Journal and Offshore Energy reported on 22 September 2026 that QatarEnergy's CEO said repairs to two damaged Ras Laffan LNG trains will take three years.
• OGJ's own parenthetical, not a quoted statement from the CEO, describes the two trains as 17% of Ras Laffan's production capacity; no company tonnage was located, so no million-tonnes conversion is offered.
• Offshore Energy reported that QatarEnergy declared force majeure to LNG buyers, linking it to the Hormuz closure; the notice's scope and current status are unconfirmed.
• OGJ reports a gas-to-liquids train returning in the first quarter of 2027 and North Field East Train 1 (8 million tonnes a year) starting in the first half of 2027; these are planned dates, not cargoes.
• No primary QatarEnergy release was located; every figure here rests on trade-press accounts of the CEO's remarks.

Two liquefaction trains at Ras Laffan damaged in March will take three years to repair, according to QatarEnergy's chief executive as reported on 22 September 2026. OGJ describes them as 17% of Ras Laffan's production capacity, a trade-press figure the company has not confirmed in any release this desk has seen. Train-level tonnage, the repair start date and the current force majeure status are all unpublished, so the size and duration of the gap are estimates.

What Al-Kaabi said in New York

Oil & Gas Journal and Offshore Energy reported on 22 September 2026 that Saad Sherida Al-Kaabi, QatarEnergy's chief executive, told the Qatar Economic Forum's special edition in New York that repairs to two damaged Ras Laffan LNG trains will take three years. This desk found no separate QatarEnergy release or transcript, so the three-year horizon rests on trade-press accounts of his remarks. It is an executive's public estimate, not an audited schedule, and the start of the repair clock is not stated.

Where the 17% figure comes from

OGJ's report describes the two damaged trains, in a parenthetical, as 17% of Ras Laffan's production capacity. That is OGJ's wording, and this desk does not present it as a direct quote from Al-Kaabi. Offshore Energy's account, as read by this desk, does not carry the figure. No QatarEnergy tonnage for the trains has been located, so this desk offers no million-tonnes-a-year conversion. Treat 17% as a reported trade-press share of one complex, unconfirmed by the company.

Cause and force majeure status

OGJ attributes the damage to the Iran war and says disruption in the Strait of Hormuz is affecting equipment delivery timelines. Offshore Energy reported that QatarEnergy declared force majeure to LNG buyers, linking it to the Hormuz closure caused by Iran. This desk has not seen the notice itself, so its scope, its date and whether it remains in force are unconfirmed. Force majeure is contractual relief from delivery obligations, not a measure of physical damage.

What could replace the lost trains

OGJ reported that North Field East Train 1, rated at 8 million tonnes a year, is expected to start in the first half of 2027, and that a gas-to-liquids train should return in the first quarter of 2027. These are planned start-ups, not loaded cargoes, and OGJ notes Hormuz disruption is slowing equipment deliveries. Because the size of the lost capacity is unpublished, this desk does not net new trains against it.

What to watch next

Three items decide how this reads: a QatarEnergy statement giving train-level tonnage and the repair start date, the status of force majeure notices to buyers, and whether North Field East Train 1 holds its first-half 2027 target. The three-year figure is one executive's estimate as reported by trade press. LNG Prime's weekly roundup lists this among its most-read items, which measures reader interest, not supply significance. This is analysis, not trading advice.